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Firms Tax Evasion in a Principal-Agent Model with
Self-Protection
Rongili Biswas Carla Marchesey Fabio Privileggiz
Abstract
Gatekeepers have an increasing role in taxation and regulation. Whereas burdening
them with legal liability for misconducts that benet those who resort to their services
actually discourages wrongdoings as will be claried in the article an alienation e¤ect
can also arise. The gatekeeper might become more interested in covering up the illegal
behavior. This article studies the problem with respect to tax evasion by rms in a
principal-agent framework. The article highlights the role of legal rules pertaining to
liability for tax evasion in shaping the parties choices, as concealment costs vary according
to whether the risk-neutral principal or the risk-averse agent are held responsible when
tax evasion is detected. The main result of the analysis is that there is a simple ex post
test that can be run to infer whether harnessing the agent was socially benecial.
Keywords: tax evasion, rm, agency, risk aversion
JEL classication: H26, H32, D81, K42
1 Introduction
There is by now a large positive and normative literature available on tax evasion dealt at
the levels of either individuals or rms (for an assessment by a founder of this literature, see
Sandmo, 2005). But not too many papers deal with the role of gatekeepers,1 like a lawyer or a
tax manager, without whose presence and active support, it may not be possible to evade tax,
whatever the underlying causes are. The e¢ cacy of tax enforcement can thus vary according
to the extent of the gatekeepers liability vis-à-vis that of the evader.
In case of rms tax evasion most models2 internalize a costly concealment technology,
which, however, is not specically described. A signicant concealment cost can instead be
studied within a principal-agent framework, as one can focus upon the compensation and the
incentives needed for securing the cooperation of tax o¢ cers, employees, consultants,3 experts
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etc. An important role that these subjects can play, in exchange for remuneration, is that of
exerting e¤ort in order to reduce the probability of audit. This can be done, e.g., by suitably
blurring the signals of misconduct that usually trigger the intervention of the tax o¢ cials, thus
helping the entrepreneur avoid the more standard hiding techniques and design new schemes
for evasion.
The agency problem of the evading rm has been studied by Chen and Chu (2005) and
Crocker and Slemrod (2005). Both papers focus on problems of asymmetry of information.
Chen and Chu (2005) consider the relationship between a rms owner and a risk-averse agent
who is hired for productive purposes. If only the risk neutral principal is legally liable, no
e¢ ciency problem arises. If, however, also the agent is liable, the principal must pay her
an ex ante compensation for the risk, as insuring the agent against sanctions is not legally
permissible. Thus the agents salary can di¤er from the one needed to provide the proper
incentives for production, and a loss of control on the agent might arise. The authors, however,
do not discuss the e¤ects of changes in the liability regime.
Crocker and Slemrod (2005) assume that both the shareholders (the principal) and the
manager (the agent) are risk neutral. They show that sanctioning the agent is always more
e¤ective than sanctioning the principal, because in the latter case the e¤ect is only indirect 
through contractual incentives4 upon the agent and is weakened by the second best nature of
the agency contract. An implication of the Crocker and Slemrods model that is problematic
is that the agents remuneration drops to zero (or to a lump sum if the reservation utility is
larger than zero) as long as only the principal is liable, since in this case the agent can costlessly
disclose the information she possesses. In the real world, however, rms are likely to provide
incentives even in this case to the agent in order to induce her to actively use her information
and skills in dealing with the specic rms case. This suggests that an approach addressing
the problem of the agents e¤ort and remuneration would be more realistic.
A second stream of literature to which this article aims at contributing is that on self-
protection (the terminology was invented by Ehrlich and Becker, 1972), i.e., an activity that
reduces the probability of occurrence of a bad outcome at a given cost (Sévi and Yal, 2005).
The e¤ort performed by the agent in the model presented in this article is actually aimed at
producing self-protection.5 It is now well-established that an increase in risk-aversion does
not necessarily lead to higher self-protection expenditures (Ehrlich and Becker, 1972; Sweeney
and Beard, 1992; Chiu, 2000). This is so because, as observed by Briys and Schlesinger (1990),
expenditure on self-protection reduces the income in all states and therefore does not necessarily
lead to less risky income prospects.
An agency model with self-protection has been studied by Privileggi et al. (2001), who
consider an (all or nothing) illegal activity that benets the principal. The resort to self-
protection  in addition to self-insurance by a risk-averse evading taxpayer has also been
studied by Lee (2001), who nds that unlike in the standard model under given assumptions,
the reported income is decreasing in the tax rate.
In this article we present a principal-agent model in which an agent is hired by an entrepre-
neur to exert e¤ort in covering tax evasion. We allow the legal regime to span from exclusive
liability of the principal to that of the agent, including the intermediate cases of shared liability.
When liability is shifted either fully or partially from the principal to the agent, the latter
4The link between managerial compensation and aggressive tax planning has also been studied in a big way
in empirical literature, focussing mainly on costly but risk-free tax avoidance. See, e.g., Deasi and Dharmapala
(2006).
5As long as the agent is liable she protects herself. Also with reference to the liable principal one may speak
of self-protection because the principal expends resources to pay the agent in order to reduce the probability of
the bad outcome.
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might be pushed to exert a higher e¤ort in covering it and thus the likelihood of detection
might decrease. Hence there is a problem of excessive loyaltyof the agent with respect to the
principal, often discussed in the psychological literature. Whereas the economic literature on
agency has mainly focussed on the opposite problem i.e., the agents opportunistic behavior
 in a more general perspective it is interesting also to apply the economic analysis to the
non-optimal loyalty problem in all its forms (see, e.g., Morck, 2009).
The article bridges some gaps in the previous literature, on the one hand by focussing
on the specic contribution to tax evasion provided by agents in terms of e¤ort (and not of
information as in Crocker and Slemrod, 2005), while on the other by directly addressing the
role of gatekeepers (and not of productive agents, as in Chen and Chu, 2005). We also allow
for di¤erent attitudes toward risk of the parties, and include a full description of the rms tax
evasion problem, in which evasion is a continuous variable (whereas the wrongdoings benet
was discrete in Privileggi et al., 2001).
Our results provide relevant indications about the relationship between the agents remu-
neration and the legal incentives in a risky environment. Whereas the standard hint coming
from the available literature is that the agents remuneration is increasing in her liability (see,
e.g., Hamdani, 2003, and, with reference to marginal bonuses, Crocker and Slemrod, 2005), we
show that there are cases in which her compensation decreases in response to an expansion of
her liability.
Our main result is that whenever ex post it is observed that the agents compensation is
lower in the (full or partial) agents liability than in the principals, then both evasion and
e¤ort must be lower as well. Hence, a simple ex post test can be run in order to ascertain
the e¤ectiveness of a reform that harnesses gatekeepers with legal liability. If a fall of their
income arises, the reform is working in the right direction. As relevant information about
compensations can be gathered from standard data sources,6 such test about the e¤ectiveness
of the liability shift can be designed.7
The article is organized as follows: in Section 2 the model is presented. Section 3 examines
the implications of liability shifts from the principal to the agent. Section 4 concludes. All
technicalities regarding the non-trivial constrained maximization techniques used in the text
and the computation of the numeric examples are available in the Appendix of Biswas et al.
(2009), the working paper version of this article.
2 The model
We assume as usual that the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk-averse.8 Moreover,
the principal cannot pursue her evasion design without securing the agents cooperation, either
for technical or legal reasons, as, e.g., only the agent possesses the needed expertise or has the
signatory authority for the needed documents. A problem that arises when the principal aims
at eliciting the agents cooperation in cheating taxes is that the contract has an illicit content
and thus is not legally enforceable. If, however, the parties have a long lasting relationship it
seems plausible that they can trust each other and can conclude and honor a contract in which
6Cfr.,e.g., the data on managerial compensation and incentives reported in the Standard and Poors Com-
pustat ExecuComp database. The applied literature in this eld also relies on surveys and on IRS data about
audited rms (see, e.g., Rego and Wilson, 2011).
7Of course this is a ceteris paribus prediction and thus other factors that might explain income changes
should be controlled for.
8This standard assumption hinges upon the idea that the principal has larger opportunities for risk diversi-
cation than the agent, whose assets are mainly represented by her specialized skills.
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the agent performs the e¤ort in covering up and the principal pays a remuneration that includes
ex ante a risk premium. Trust might be based on repeated interactions, that would arise if, e.g.,
the agent is an employee or a consultant with a strong link with the enterprise. Moreover, it is
more likely if the principal knows the agents preferences and can observe the agents e¤ort. It
is interesting now to note how full information plays a crucial role in the model that we set up
in this context. Trust is less plausible if information is imperfect. Moreover, full information of
both parties can sustain all liability assignments independently of the specic legal denition of
the tax evasion wrongdoing. That is, if the principals information is imperfect, this might give
her a chance to distance herself, e.g.., from the accusation of tax fraud, alleging that on her
part there was just ignorance or mistake.9 Thus, in this section and for most of the paper we
focus upon the case of full information10. An extension to the case of asymmetrical information
is briey presented in Subsection 3.4.
In order to study the e¤ects of various liability assignments, let us assume that in case of
audit the principal has to pay the due tax and bears a share 0    1 of sanctions, whereas
the agent has to pay the remaining share (1  ). Hence, full principals liability arises when
 = 1, full agents liability when  = 0, while intermediate  values refer to shared liability.
The principals problem then is:
max f[1  p (x) (1 + s)] tE   rg
s.t.
8<:
[1  p (x)]u (r) + p (x)u [r   (1  ) stE]  g (x)  u0
E  Y
x  0; r  0; E  0:
(1)
where x is the agents e¤ort in covering up, p : R+ ! [0; 1] denotes the probability of audit as
a function of the agents e¤ort x, s > 0 is the sanction rate, 0 < t < 1 is the tax rate, Y > 0
denotes the principals income, E  Y is the evaded amount, r is the agents remuneration,
u : R ! R is the agents utility function, u0 is her reservation utility, while g : R+ ! R+
denotes the cost of e¤ort x borne by the agent. Y is assumed to be exogenous.11 The rst
constraint allows for the agents participation.
In order to problem (1) be viable, evasion must be protable, that is,
[1  p (x) (1 + s)] tE   r > 0 (2)
must hold. As r  0, from (2) immediately follows that necessarily E > 0 must hold, so that
the last inequality constraint in (1) can be dropped.
A. 1 In the following we shall assume:
i) u0 (w) > 0 and u00 (w) < 0, for all w 2 R,
ii) 0 < p (x) < 1, p0 (x) < 0 and p00 (x) > 0 for all x  0,
9The agent instead is informed by denition as long as she expends e¤ort in cheating. But it is equally true
that the law might exclude her legal responsibility on the ground that she is the weaker party in a capital-labour
relationship or she may not have a deep pocket or she does not directly benet from evasion.
10While the agency model is routinely associated with the idea of asymmetrical information, the original
formulation of the problem includes also the full information case (see, e.g., some classical papers such as
Shavell, 1979, pp.55-56 and Arrow, 1985, p. 37). We interpret the term agency here without any moral hazard
component. In other words, it is a benchmark case of agency where the principal has full information.
11In order to ensure that the agent has a pocket deep enough for sustaining her liability, one might assume
that she too has an exogenous income  coming, e.g., from a legal activity. Because the inclusion of such
constant term is immaterial with respect to our theoretical results, for simplicity we have dropped it.
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iii) g0 (x) > 0 and g00 (x)  0 for all x > 0,
iv) u (0)  u0, g (0) = 0, g0+ (0) = 0.
Assumption A.1(iv) is a technical condition which, joint with the feasibility assumption in
(2), is su¢ cient to rule out corner solutions12 in problem (1).
The agents compensation must be larger than her expected sanction, as stated in the
following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption A.1 and condition (2) the risk-averse agent must receive a salary
larger than her expected liability, and evasion must have an overall positive expected return.
Specically:
r > p (x) (1  ) stE for all x  0 and E  Y (3)
1  p (x) (1 + s) > 0 for all x  0: (4)
Proof. To establish (3) assume the contrary: r  p (x) (1  ) stE. Hence,
[1  p (x)]u (r) + p (x)u [r   (1  ) stE]  g (x) < u [r   p (x) (1  ) stE]  g (x)
 u (0)  g (x)
 u0;
where the rst inequality follows from strict concavity of u (), the second inequality from
monotonicity of u () joint with the contradiction r  p (x) (1  ) stE and the last inequality
from Assumptions A.1 (iii) and (iv). Therefore, the agents participation constraint the rst
inequality in (1) implies (3).
Joining (2) and (3) easily yields (4).
The agents expected utility,
EU (x; r; E) = [1  p (x)]u (r) + p (x)u [r   (1  ) stE]  g (x) ;
is concave in each relevant variable, E, r and x, taken alone, but concavity jointly in all three
variables could lack because of cross-e¤ects. In the Appendix 6.A of Biswas et al. (2009)
su¢ cient conditions for assuring quasiconcavity of EU and thus convexity of the constraint
 are put forth and discussed. Convexity of the constraint in problem (1) implies that for
every given evasion and e¤ort combination, there is just one compensation r representing the
minimal cost the principal has to bear for implementing such combination without violating the
agents participation constraint. Large families of functions, such as, e.g.., HARA (Hyperbolic
Absolute Risk Aversion) utility functions, hyperbolic probability functions and quadratic e¤ort
cost, satisfy these conditions.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption A.1 a solution (x; r; E) for problem (1) is completely
characterized by the following necessary K.T. conditions:
[1  p (x)]u (r) + p (x)u [r   (1  ) stE]  g (x) = u0 (5)
 p0 (x) f(1 + s) tE [(1  p (x))u0 (r) + p (x)u0 (r   (1  ) stE)]
+u (r)  u [r   (1  ) stE]g = g0 (x) (6)
[1  p (x)]u0 (r)
p (x)u0 [r   (1  ) stE] 
(1  ) s
1  p (x) (1 + s)   1: (7)
12Actually, Assumption A.1(iv) is not strictly needed and in specic examples the condition that g0+ (0) = 0
may be dropped whereas interiority of solution can be obtained directly through a suitable choice of parameters
values.
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The proof of Proposition 1 is based on standard tedious computations and thus it is omitted.
Condition (6) pertaining to e¤ort combines elements relevant for the principal the agents
marginal utility of income in the two states of the world, that drives the monetary remuneration
 and elements relevant for the agent  the di¤erence between the utility levels in the two
states of the world, which provides the personal motivation for exerting e¤ort. Condition (7)
pertaining to the tax evasion amount holds as a strict inequality when the second constraint,
E  Y in (1), is binding, i.e., when E = Y .
One can interpret tax evasion as a choice of a risk-averse agent, as the LHS in (7) has
the standard form it takes in individual tax evasion problems. Relative prices, however, are
distorted. That is, now the slope in absolute value of the budget constraint facing the agent 
the RHS of (7) is lower than in a standard evasion problem (where it would be equal to s)
because the agent is only partially liable for sanctions and does not have to pay the tax on the
evaded amount.13
As long as  = 1 i.e., only the principal is liable problem (1) highly simplies. Calling
(xP ; r

P ; E

P ) the solution in this case, one gets the following necessary and su¢ cient conditions:
EP = Y; (8)
u (rP )  g (xP ) = u0; (9)
 p0 (xP ) (1 + s) tY =
g0 (xP )
u0 (rP )
: (10)
Condition (8) states that, at the optimum, the whole income Y will be hidden, whereas
conditions (9) and (10) say respectively that the agent must receive her reservation utility14
and that the marginal benet of e¤ort for the principal, in terms of reduction of the expected
sanctions,  p0 (xP ) (1 + s) tY , must equal the marginal rate of substitution between e¤ort and
compensation, g0 (xP ) =u
0 (rP ), for the agent.
The agents risk-aversion plays a decisive role in explaining why results di¤er under shared
liability and under exclusive principals liability. If the agent were risk neutral, a corner solution
with full evasion  i.e., E = Y would arise also under shared liability because in this case
the LHS in (7) becomes [1  p (x)] =p (x) and it is straightforward to show that condition (4)
implies
1  p (x)
p (x)
>
(1  ) s
1  p (x) (1 + s)   1 for all 0   < 1:
Moreover, condition (6) boils down to (10). Hence, with a risk neutral agent, the same tax
evasion and e¤ort would arise independently of the liability assignment, whereas the agents
salary would be larger under shared liability by a share 1    of the expected amount of
sanctions.
3 The consequences of a liability shift
If the legal regime is changed from full liability of the principal to shared or full agents liability,
what are the consequences on e¤ort?
13Even assuming a full shift of liability for sanctions onto the agent, when  = 0, condition (4) implies that
the RHS in (7) satises s= [1  p (x)]   1 < s. In other words, the absolute value of the slope of the agents
budget constraint is smaller than s, as tax evasion must have positive expected total rate of return.
14The agent that cooperates in tax cheating without any personal risk might threaten the principal of disclosing
the wrongdoingand and demand more than her reservation utility. We assume that the relationship based on
trust between the parties is strong enough to exclude this possibility.
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As under Assumption A.1  g0 (x) =p0 (x) is increasing in e¤ort x, by comparing the FOCs
for e¤ort (6) and (10), it turns out that an e¤ort smaller than under the exclusive principals
liability occurs if and only if
(1 + s) tE f[1  p (x)]u0 (r) + p (x)u0 [r   (1  ) stE]g (11)
+u (r)  u [r   (1  ) stE]  u0 (rP ) (1 + s) tY
where the subscript P characterizes the case of full principals liability. Because in the LHS
the choice can be traced back to a risk-averse agent,15 whereas in the RHS to a risk neutral
one, the well-known problem of self-protection is at stake; that is, in general one cannot say
whether inequality (11) will be satised or not (see Privileggi et al., 2001). Hence, the only
possible hint is that, whenever E ! 0, then the LHS ! 0 as well and thus a smaller e¤ort
will occur under shared liability. One can thus guess that, as long as the agents risk-aversion
induces the choice of a small evasion level, at the limit this will also drive the e¤ort downwards.
This fact suggests the idea that the evasion level inuences the amount of e¤ort performed in
the diverse liability regimes. In the following subsections this idea is checked within a more
general scenario; as a matter of fact, besides the limit relationship between evasion level and
e¤ort performed just considered, we shall establish a su¢ cient condition linking the decrease
of both evasion level and e¤ort to the decrease of optimal remuneration.
3.1 E¤ects on the principals prot
When liability is partially or fully shifted from the principal to the agent, the latter might be
pushed to exert a larger e¤ort, thus giving rise to positive externalities for the principal. On
the other hand, both e¤ort and the residual risk command a compensation. The combined
e¤ect on the principals prot is described in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Ceteris paribus, the principal prot is maximal when she is fully liable, and is
decreasing in the agents liability share.16
Proof. Di¤erentiating the Lagrangian L of problem (1) with respect to r and noting that, as
r > 0, the Lagrange multiplier of the fourth constraint is zero, one gets:
 1 +  f[1  p (x)]u0 (r) + p (x)u0 [r   (1  ) stE]g = 0
where  is the Lagrange multiplier of the agents participation constraint the rst constraint
in (1). Hence:
 =
1
[1  p (x)]u0 (r) + p (x)u0 [r   (1  ) stE] :
By the envelope theorem,
@L
@
=  p (x) stE + p (x)u0 [r   (1  ) stE] stE
=  p (x) stE f1  u0 [r   (1  ) stE]g
=  p (x) stE

1  u
0 [r   (1  ) stE]
[1  p (x)]u0 (r) + p (x)u0 [r   (1  ) stE]

:
15Remember the similarity with a standard evasion choice under a distorted budget constraint.
16We are indebted to an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach as an alternative to our original
weaker result.
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If  < 1, then u0 (r) < u0 [r   (1  ) stE], and thus @L=@ > 0; if  > 1, then @L=@ < 0,
while if  = 1, then @L=@ = 0. Therefore, the principals prot is maximal when she has full
liability,  = 1, while it is decreasing in  as long as  > 1.17
Proposition 2 extends Proposition 2 in Privileggi et al. (2001) to the case of a continuous
wrongdoing. The intuition about this result is that under full liability of the principal the
whole risk si allocated to the risk-neutral party, which is the one more able at bearing it. As
the principal chooses the e¤ort level, she does not need to put the agent at risk to provide
incentives, as happens in models with asymmetrical information.18
The marginal cost of tax evasion, however, might be lower under shared liability.19 Moreover,
even if in response to a liability shift a lower tax evasion is chosen, the expected tax revenue,
G (E; x) = tY   tE [1  p (x) (1 + s)] ; (12)
does not necessarily increase, because also the expected sanctions must be accounted for. Thus,
one cannot a priori exclude thatG (E; x) decreases even if there is more tax compliance, because
the countervailing e¤ect of an x increase might be stronger.
3.2 A simple test
Let us focus upon the potentially favorable case in which the principals response to the liability
shift, which negatively impacts her prot, leads to a smaller tax evasion. More specically, we
consider a bold cut, so large that actually a reduction of the agents compensation ensues.
Recall that a subscript Pindicates the optimal solution (xP ; r

P ; E

P ) of (1) when liability is
fully borne by the principal, while (x; r; E) denotes the optimal solution when liability is
shared with the agent.
Proposition 3 If it is observed that r  rP , then both x < xP and E < EP = Y must hold.
Proof. From (9) we get
rP = u
 1 [u0 + g (xP )] ; (13)
where u 1 () denotes the (strictly increasing and strictly convex) inverse function of u (). Strict
concavity of u () and condition (5) imply:
u [r   p (x) (1  ) stE] > [1  p (x)]u (r) + p (x)u [r   (1  ) stE]
= u0 + g (x
) ;
which, again using u 1 (), itself yields:
r > u 1 [u0 + g (xP )] + p (x
) (1  ) stE > u 1 [u0 + g (x)] : (14)
Under the assumption r  rP (13) and (14) lead to
u 1 [u0 + g (x)] < r  rP = u 1 [u0 + g (xP )] ;
which, as both u 1 () and g () are strictly increasing, immediately yields x < xP , and the
rst part of the Proposition is established.
17The case  > 1 would imply an overshift of sanctions onto the agent and is not relevant in practice.
18On this case see Subsection 3.4.
19We thank Sam Bukovetsky for raising this point.
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To show that E < EP = Y holds as well, note that  g0 (x) =p0 (x) is increasing in e¤ort x,
so that x < xP implies  g0 (x) =p0 (x) <  g0 (xP ) =p0 (xP ), and thus conditions (6) and (10),
in turn, imply
(1 + s) tE [(1  p (x))u0 (r) + p (x)u0 (r   (1  ) stE)] + u (r)  u [r   (1  ) stE]
< (1 + s) tY u0 (rP ) :
(15)
By strict concavity of u (), both
u0 [r   (1  ) stE] > u0 (r)
and (superdi¤erentiability property)
u (r)  u [r   (1  ) stE] > (1  ) stEu0 (r) ;
hold. Substituting the last two inequalities in (15) and rearranging terms yields
(1 + s) tY u0 (rP ) > (1 + s) tE
u0 (r) + (1  ) stEu0 (r)
= (1 + s) tEu0 (r)
 (1 + s) tEu0 (rP ) ;
where in the last inequality we used the assumption r  rP and again concavity of u ().
Simplifying common (positive) terms in both sides yields Y > E, as was to be shown.
The proof of Proposition 3 resorts to a revealed preferences approach. The intuition is that
if a compensation decrease is observed after the liability shift, e¤ort must also be lower, since
now such compensation not only pays for the e¤ort but it must also include an ex-ante premium
for the risk. Moreover, the choice for a smaller e¤ort implies that its marginal cost drops and
thus the e¤ort marginal benet must also be lower than beforehand. Since the agents utility
function is concave, the e¤ort marginal benet can be lower than under the full principals
liability only if the potential loss is actually smaller,20 that is if tax evasion is lower as well.
Proposition 3 provides the basics for running ex post tests aimed at assessing if a liability
shift was benecial from a social point of view. If a (weak) decrease in the gains of the agent is
observed, there is an unequivocal signal of the success of the policy because a decrease of both
tax evasion and e¤ort imply that Government revenue in (12) will increase. An increase in the
agents compensation, on the other hand, is not a signal in the opposite direction: one cannot
infer what is going on in terms of tax evasion and e¤ort without further information.
3.3 Examples
In order to build some tractable examples we shall use a CARA utility function, a hyperbolic
probability function and a quadratic e¤ort function, as specied below:
u (w) =  e w;  > 0
p (x) =

(x+ 1)
; 0 <  < 1;  > 0
g (x) = x2;  > 0:
20Remember that e¤ort benets only the principal under full principals liability, while it a¤ects also the
agents utility under shared liability.
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Whenever parameter  is chosen su¢ ciently large, such specication guarantees that the par-
ticipation constraint in the maximization problem (1) is convex.21 As can be seen in Appendix
6.C of Biswas et al.(2009) the models specication above guarantees that the optimal solution
(x; r; E) of problem (1) is unique, thus allowing for a meaningful comparison among scenar-
ios characterized by di¤erent degrees of liability borne by the agent spanning from the case
in which only the principal is liable to the opposite case in which the agent bears full liability.
We shall x all the parametersvalues except for the sanction rate s and the coe¢ cient of
absolute risk-aversion . Specically, we set Y = 100, u0 =  0:9, t = 0:4,  = 0:1,  = 1 and
 = 0:556 (see Example 1 in Appendix 6.A in Biswas et al., 2009 for the compatibility of these
values with the convexity of the constraint). The cases of exclusive principal liability ( = 1),
exclusive agents liability ( = 0) and shared liability (with  = 0:5) will be considered.
We shall investigate how the optimal solutions (x; r; E) characterized by conditions (5)
(7) of Proposition 1, together with the principals net benet , change for di¤erent values of
the absolute risk-aversion coe¢ cient  and the sanction rate s. The results are computed with
the support of Maple 13 (see Appendix 6.C in Biswas et al., 2009). Table 1 reports the results
for s = 2:1 whereas either  = 10 or  = 0:5. Table 2 reports the results for s = 1 whereas
again either  = 10 or  = 0:5.
Risk-aversion
coe¢ cient
Principal fully
liable:  = 1
Shared liabi-
lity:  = 0:5
Agent fully
liable:  = 0
 = 10
xP = 1:233
rP = 0:290
EP = 100
P = 34:158
x = 0:577
r = 0:225
E = 1:078
 = 0:150
x = 0:305
r = 0:073
E = 0:286
 = 0:032
 = 0:5
xP = 0:839
rP = 1:352
EP = 100
P = 31:906
x = 0:577
r = 4:510
E = 21:570
 = 2:997
x = 0:305
r = 1:469
E = 5:715
 = 0:642
Table 1: optimal solutions and principals net benet in three regimes (full principals liability,
equally shared liability and full agents liability) when the sanction rate is s = 2:1 for risk-
aversion coe¢ cents  = 10 and  = 0:5.
Note that when the agent is fully or partially liable and the solutions are interior  i.e.,
0 < E < Y hold the optimal e¤orts x turns out to be independent of the absolute risk-
aversion coe¢ cient , as explained at the end of Appendix 6.C in Biswas et al. (2009). Intuition
suggests the following explanation: because with CARA the desired amount of tax evasion does
not depend on income, the latter can always be adjusted to accommodate the preferred e¤ort
while also securing the reservation utility. Hence the salary r and the evasion E change in
response to changes in risk aversion, whereas e¤ort does not. This property does not hold for
corner solutions, i.e., when E = Y .
Numerical examples conrm that a liability shift from the principal onto the agent can
actually entail a reduction of the agents remuneration, which in turn implies that both evasion
and e¤ort are smaller. This e¤ect is more likely at high sanction and/or high risk aversion
levels. The relevant sanction severity depends on both the rate s and the amount of risk shifted
upon the agent. On the other hand, an increase in the agents compensation may entail either
21See condition conditions (38), (42) of Remark 2, and (47) of Remark 4 in Appendix 6.A in Biswas et al.
(2009).
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Risk-aversion
coe¢ cient
Principal fully
liable:  = 1
Shared liabi-
lity:  = 0:5
Agent fully
liable:  = 0
 = 10
xP = 1:213
rP = 0:249
EP = 100
P = 36:136
x = 1:198
r = 19:918
E = 100
 = 17:352
x = 0:550
r = 0:311
E = 1:369
 = 0:202
 = 0:5
xP = 0:729
rP = 1:005
EP = 100
P = 34:367
x = 0:774
r = 15:384
E = 100
 = 21:234
x = 0:550
r = 6:214
E = 27:385
 = 4:033
Table 2: optimal solutions and principals net benet when the sanction rate is s = 1 in the
three regimes again for risk-aversion coe¢ cents  = 10 and  = 0:5.
a decrease in e¤ort and evasion, as in the third column of the second row in table 2, or an
increase in e¤ort, as in the case of full evasion (corner solution) reported in the second column
of the second row of Table 2. The latter case is more likely when the sanction is lower and/or
the agent is less risk-averse.
3.4 Extension: the e¤ects of a liability shift under asymmetrical
information
In this subsection we briey discuss the case in which the principal cannot observe the agents
e¤ort. If trust between the parties is so strong that the principal can condition the agents
salary on the outcome, the consequences are straightforward: the principal can design a second
best contract for the agent, and, according to the principal-agent model under moral hazard,22
the standard result will arise; i.e., the agent will receive a higher salary if cheating is not found
out and a lower salary in the opposite case. In such a framework liability shifts provided for
by the law have no e¤ect, since any consequence can be corrected via modications of the
agents compensation scheme. This case, however, seems too extreme, since the detection of
the wrong-doing might disrupt the trust relationship between the parties and the principal can
refuse to bail out the agent in the bad state of the world without bearing any legal consequence.
A more realistic case is when there is information asymmetry but no possibility of condi-
tioning the agents compensation on the outcome. If the principal is fully liable, she can hire
the agent just to secure that she accepts renouncing her role as gatekeeper, with no e¤ort aimed
at reducing the probability of detection. The agent, in fact, being not liable, has no motivation
for exerting e¤ort, so the principals problem reduces to:
max
r;E
f[1  p (0) (1 + s)] tE   [1  p (0)] rg
s.t. u (r)  u0;
that is, the principal needs to give a compensation large enough to secure the agents reservation
utility. Hence the result will be full evasion and no e¤ort as long as [1  p (0) (1 + s)] tY  
[1  p (0)]u 1 (u0) > 0, and no evasion in the opposite case.
22Note that the so called rst order approach can be applied to solve this problem, as the agents utility is
concave in x for given r and E, while with only two possible outcomes the rst order stochastic dominance is
implied by the fact that a larger e¤ort entails a larger probability of success for the principal.
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If liability is shared, the law actually provides incentives for the agents e¤ort, as pointed
out by Shavell (1997). However, the agent will request an ex-ante compensation for the risk.
In this framework, the principals problem becomes:
max
r;E
f[1  p (x) (1 + s)] tE   rg
s.t.

[1  p (x)]u (r) + p (x)u [r   (1  ) stE]  g (x) = u0
 p0 (x) fu (r)  u [r   (1  ) stE]g = g0 (x) ;
where the second constraint represents the FOC for the agents expected utility with respect
to the e¤ort x for r and E given.23 That is, the principal recognizes that she is not able to
motivate the agent to exert e¤ort by providing incentives through the compensation scheme,
and thus simply takes as given that the agent will choose the optimal e¤ort from her point of
view. Substituting the second constraint into the rst one we get:
max
r;E
f[1  p (x) (1 + s)] tE   rg
s.t. u (r) + p (x)
g0 (x)
p0 (x)
  g (x) = u0
where x refers to the optimal e¤ort from the agents point of view. Since the prot function is
linear in E, a variable that does not appear in the unique equality constraint above, either the
return is positive and E = Y or no evasion occurs.
Note also that the principals prot can be larger under shared liability than under exclusive
liability when information is asymmetrical. In fact the sanction share (1  ) placed on the
agent may imply a di¤erence between the agents net compensations in case of success and in
case of failure that exactly implements a standard principal-agent contract under moral hazard,
thus providing the best arrangement for the principal. Hence Proposition 2 cannot be extended
to the case of asymmetric information.
Di¤erentiating the agents FOCs with respect to , one gets:
p0 (x)u0 [r   (1  ) stE] stE < 0
Because the second order condition implies a negative derivative of the FOC with respect to x,
by the implicit function theorem @x= < 0; i.e., the agent exerts a larger e¤ort the larger her
liability share. This means that as long as tax evasion stays worthwhile24, the larger the agents
liability share, the worse the result in terms of expected tax revenue for the state and the larger
the agents compensation. In the opposite case tax evasion is discontinued25 and compensation
drops to zero. Note that these results (even if extreme and thus not very realistic) stay within
the provisions of Proposition 3 in the paper.
4 Conclusion
Tax evasion by rms is a very complicated phenomenon that can be understood only by tracing
back its roots to the rms internal organization which describes how the responsibilities and the
23Because, under our assumptions, the agents expected utility is concave in x when r and E are held xed,
the FOC completely characterizes the unique solution of the agents maximization problem.
24Evasion might even become worthwhile under shared liability while it was not under full principals liability,
as long as the incentives on the agent due to the liability shift benet the principal.
25This might happen, e.g., if the liability shift is too large, thus implying ine¢ cient and too costly incentives.
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incentives are allocated and how they interact in producing the rms behavior. The principal-
agent model o¤ers a natural framework for studying this problem. It also represents a very
exible framework in which di¤erent scenarios can be studied according to the assumptions
made about the partiesattitudes toward risk, the information they possess and the type of
activity that the agent is expected to do within the rm.
In this article we have studied the case in which the cooperation of a risk-averse agent (such
as an employee or a consultant) is needed in order to evade taxes. Moreover, the agent can
exert e¤ort in order to reduce the ensuing risk. In this framework policies aimed at curbing tax
evasion can target either the principal or the agent or both of them.
The immediate policy aspects of this article are as follows: when liability is shifted from
the principal to the agent, a problem of excessive loyalty might arise, and the agent might be
pushed to help the principal in concealing tax evasion. However, we are also able to show that
there are win-win scenarios, in which both tax evasion and e¤ort in covering decrease. A tough
enforcement policy and an agents high risk-aversion render these scenarios more likely. An
indicator that the win-win case has arisen is a decrease in the agents remuneration. Thus, a
signal of success of policies that crack on tax o¢ cers, consultants and tax preparers, in order
to moralize their conduct and to curb tax evasion, would be a shrinking of their remunerations
and income share, ceteris paribus. Indirect signals might be represented by the shrinking of the
share of the population involved in activities pertaining to tax preparation and in the share of
students demanding education in this eld, of course once again controlling for other possible
explanatory factors.
One might in principle also consider going the other way round, i.e., setting caps on the
compensations for assistance to the taxpayers, in order to discourage risky cooperation with
evaders. However, because the ceilings should not fall short of the remuneration level adequate
for legally permissible assistance, the information needed to design them seem beyond the reach
of the regulator. What is sometimes done,26 and might be advisable to do to a larger extent, is
setting penalties as an increasing function of the gatekeepers illegitimate gains, in order to cap
at least the expected benets that gatekeepers receive if they contribute to illegal activities.
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